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Common principles for trading
partners 
Anti-monopoly policy and especially state
aid are important components of trade, as
providing state aid to business has a
substantial effect on conditions of trade.
The provision of state aid by a country
often leads to the launching of
anti-dumping investigations against its
traders. Common policy principles in this
area can contribute to the rapid, effective
resolution of disputes between trading
partners. 
The adoption of an agreement on a free
trade area between Ukraine and the EU,
which may happen after Ukraine accedes to
the WTO, could prove both a model and an
incentive for reforming state aid.
With formal commitments, the Ukrainian
Government will be able to more
successfully defend the interests of the
entire country, leaning on lobbies in
specific industrial sectors. Ultimately, 
the result of such reforms should also 
be greater effectiveness and efficiency 
in the delivery of state aid. 
What the EU requires
The standard EU requirements to harmonize
legislation on the provision on state aid
have already been written into joint
agreements between Ukraine and the EU,
specifically in the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement. These include: 
1. A legal definition of state aid that
complies with the definition accepted
in the EU.
2. Transparency in the delivery of state
aid. To meet this requirement, a list of
institutions providing state aid must be
drawn up, an independent supervisory
body set up, and regular reports
published on the types, volumes and
recipients of state aid.
3. The principle of prohibiting state aid if
it deteriorates trade conditions
between Ukraine and the EU. 
Ukraine still has to fulfill most of these
requirements. The 2004 Bill “On state aid”
was rejected because of some controversial
provisions. Currently, there are plans to
amend the Law “On protecting commercial
competition,” which only partly meets
European requirements. 
Change in policy without
matching institutional change 
is unsustainable
The Government has not clearly identified
the criteria for providing state aid.
Moreover, it has not designated investment
projects that might have a right to state
aid or identified penalties for violating the
conditions for getting state aid. 
As a result, state aid continues to be
ineffective. For this reason, SEZs and TPDs
became an example of how a good idea 
for regional development and attracting
investment can go bad in the
implementation. Support for car-making is
an example of poorly selected priorities. 
In addition, although this sector was
granted tax benefits worth billions of
hryvnias, inconsistent government policy—
preferential conditions were changed
several times—obviously became an
obstacle to investment. 
According to ICPS calculations, over
2000–2005, tax benefits were worth
2–2.5% of GDP. The main recipients of
these indirect subsidies were car-makers
and fuel and energy companies. Serious
volumes of indirect support are provided
across the economy through subsidized
energy. For example, in 2005, arrears for
payments for electricity, gas and heating
were about 3.7% of GDP, while hidden
subsidies because of over-low gas prices
were 0.5% of GDP. In H1’06, these hidden
subsidies went up to 1.2% of GDP. This
affects exporters, as one of the arguments
the EU used to justify anti-dumping probes
against Ukrainian pipe makers was
domestic energy subsidies. 
In 2005, the Government seriously cut
benefits for a number of machine-building
sectors and as well as benefits under
special investment regimes. In addition to
the expected State Budget deficit, this
decision was conditioned by the lack of
transparency and effectiveness in the
delivery of this state aid. However, planned
changes in the Draft 2007 State Budget
and intentions to renew breaks for
companies operating in SEZs and TPDs
point to continuing unpredictability in
state aid policy in Ukraine. 
How to improve the provision 
of state aid 
In 2005–2006, Ukraine obtained market
economy status from both the EU and the
US. These long-awaited decisions meant
recognition of the country’s progress in the
economic sphere and the socio-political
arena. In addition, Ukraine has already
signed the majority of the necessary
bilateral agreements to accede to the WTO.
However, its Government still needs to
make the maximum efforts to gain the
status of a functioning market economy.
Among others, this means rationalizing
state aid and making it effective. 
1. Revising priorities. This means
reconsidering priorities by emphasizing the
environmental, regional and R&D aspects of
state aid to manufacturing. Thus, for
example, the EU–25 spends 25% of its
state aid on environmental projects and
energy-saving, 12% is spent on R&D and
another 12% is channeled to develop SMEs.
As a country likely to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) next 
year, Ukraine needs to comply with international standards for the provision 
of state aid. Expanded bilateral economic relations between Ukraine and the
European Union also mean changes in the country’s anti-monopoly policies.
With widespread ineffectiveness and inefficiency, Ukraine’s policies for
providing state aid have needed a rethink for a long time. As part of 
the “Industrial restructuring in the NIS: Experience of and lessons from 
the new EU Member States” project (INDEUNIS), ICPS specialists have some
recommendations for improvements
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Regardless of the fact that Ukraine and the
majority of the EU countries are at
different stages of economic development,
priorities in providing horizontal assistance
are important for the country. Unless the
country develops science, its economy will
not be able to grow rapidly. The solution to
the issue of energy-saving—and
simultaneously to environmental
problems—is a top priority for Ukraine,
which has to restructure its
energy-intensive industries. 
2. Reforming the energy sector. The
Government must gradually stop providing
hidden subsidies through support to the
energy sector, especially by reviving
liberalization of the gas market and
increasing regulatory capacity. It makes
sense to improve the collection of
payments in the energy sector and to
improve the efficiency of the social
security system. 
3. Strengthening institutions and
providing legislative support. This should
facilitate Ukraine’s transition from the
insider economy or ruchne upravlinnia (the
practice of hands-on regulation and
distribution of rents). Ensuring independent
and transparent decision-making by
regulatory and competition authorities
requires legislative changes as well as
proper enforcement. Predictable policies in
the provision of state aid are extremely
important for business. 
4. Supporting dialog. Any policy changes
will face resistance from powerful interest
groups, as was demonstrated by the
difficulty with adopting WTO legislation in
the Verkhovna Rada. The Government
should have a dialog with stakeholders by
quantifying and justifying the costs and
benefits of a given decision.
The present document is one output from 
an international research project financed 
by the EU’s 6th Framework Programme. 
This project is being implemented by ICPS 
in cooperation with research institutes from
other countries. For additional information
contact Ildar Gazizullin by telephone 
at (380-44) 484-4403 or via e-mail 
at igazizullin@icps.kiev.ua.
The Premier’s statement did little to
illuminate the Government’s short-term or
long-term plans with regard to relations with
NATO. It is not clear what Ukraine’s refusal to
join the MAP will mean for the reform of the
country’s Armed Forces and its security
sector. How will Ukraine’s ambiguous
position affect its relations with partners
both West and East?
Moreover, the Premier’s announcement gave
no answer to the question, What is the
Government’s position in terms of ensuring
Ukraine’s national security? Has it weighed
the costs and benefits of joining the MAP? If
Ukraine does not join the MAP, what form
will its cooperation with NATO now take? If
Ukraine does not want to become a member,
what alternative to NATO does the
Government see?
By not providing a clear, unambiguous and
well-grounded answer to these questions,
the Government is intentionally reducing
discussion around NATO to black-and-white
cliches and deliberately ignoring the fact
that the issue of Ukraine’s national security
has now moved from the political arena to
the level of state policy.
The Premier explained his decision to “take a
break” as necessary in order to increase the
level of popular support for Ukraine’s
membership in NATO. But the Draft 2007
State Budget actually cuts state funding for
a public awareness campaign on integration
with NATO to UAH 3mn, from UAH 5.3mn 
in the 2006 Budget. By comparison, in
Slovenia, whose GDP is one third of Ukraine’s, 
a similar campaign in 2001 cost the country
US $7.5mn.
In addition to formally not joining the MAP,
the Premier’s decision has disrupted the
entire logic of the process of cooperation
that Ukraine has undertaken with NATO.
Moreover, the MAP itself is mostly needed by
Ukraine, because it is an internal country
plan for carrying out political, economic and
social reforms, for internal security, for
strengthening democratic institutions, for
human rights, for the court system, and for
reforming the army and internal security
agencies—and it does not obligate the
country to join NATO after its completion.
Considering the importance of integration
with NATO for Ukraine’s national security, the
serious concern is being expressed by
think-tanks and community organizations
over the situation since the Premier’s
bombshell in Brussels, and the conflict over
political integration with NATO among
Ukraine’s political leadership and Ukrainian
society, the International Centre for Policy
Studies is calling on government bodies and
civil society organizations to begin a
broad-based public dialog on Ukraine’s
integration with NATO and the benefits of
carrying out the Membership Action Plan.
ICPS supports calls by leading think-tanks
and community organizations to hold a
special session of the National Security
Council dedicated to this issue. We believe
that this kind of meeting also needs to be
done in the presence of television cameras
with the participation of top analysts from
both state and non-government
organizations, with this kind of agenda:
1. The meaning and purpose of Ukraine’s
relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance
as it is set up in the Membership Action
Plan.
2. The Verkhovna Rada–Government
coalition’s vision of the meaning and plan of
action in terms of carrying out the Manifesto
of National Unity and Ukrainian legislation
on national security and relations with the
North Atlantic Alliance.
3. A review of the Draft State Budget of
Ukraine with regard to the items on plans to
increase public awareness about NATO
activities and Ukraine’s integration with the
Alliance.
ICPS is of the opinion that an open meeting
of the NSC should not become a platform for
any particular political force to force its own
solutions on this issue “down everybody’s
throats.” Instead, the NSC should launch a
public debate about Ukraine’s relationship
with NATO and the Government’s policies in
this area at the highest possible level.
For additional information contact Viktor
Chumak by telephone at (380-44) 484-4400 
or via e-mail at vchumak@icps.kiev.ua.
Premier Viktor Yanukovych’s 14 September announcement in Brussels that
Ukraine would postpone joining the Membership Action Plan (MAP) indefinitely
demonstrated that Ukraine currently does not have a coordinated and
consistent policy of integration with NATO. The country’s foreign policy remains
hostage to the struggle for power. Meanwhile, not only Ukrainian society but
also politicians themselves understand little about the purpose of integrating
Ukraine with NATO and the Membership Action Plan
The ICPS position on integration with NATO
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